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ABSTRACT
The rise of FinTech has not only advanced operational efficiency of the
financial industry but also posed challenges to regulatory efficiency. There
is a growing consensus on the importance and urgency for financial
regulators to enhance their capacity through the use of RegTech. RegTech is
widely considered as holding a great potential to facilitate the supervisory
process and enhance the regulatory compliance. The current studies of
RegTech, however, remains in its infancy. Most of the literature identifies
and stock-takes different technologies and discusses how to apply them to
facilitate financial regulation and supervision. These studies, in our view,
mainly focus on the conduct aspect of RegTech. Of equal importance, yet
largely overlooked, is the organizational aspect of RegTech, that is, how the
organizational design and culture of a financial regulator affects its capability
and suitability for applying RegTech to facilitate financial regulation and
supervision.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by offering more insights on how to
organize a financial regulator to ensure its accountability, flexibility, and
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adaptiveness in the era of RegTech. We argue that such a regulator requires
the character of a public-private partnership, which should contain some
public elements to ensure the unbiasedness of financial supervision and some
private elements to adapt to rapid technological changes. This paper firstly
conducts a comparative analysis of the worldwide organizational models of
financial regulators, by which we identify four major types and compare the
different public-private relationship between them. The paper then applies
the analytical framework of the Transaction Cost Economics, particularly the
Theory of Firm and the Comparative Institutional Approach, to theorize a
spectrum of public-private-partnership for different organizational models of
financial regulators, ranging from a firm-type of partnership to a contract-
type of partnership. Based on this theorized spectrum, together with the
comparative institutional approach, this paper identifies four more possible
models of public-private-partnership that may help financial regulators
streamline their organizational structure to promote the adoption of
RegTech. These models include a mixed ownership RegTech corporation, a
contracted RegTech supporter, a quasi-public financial regulator, and
directly delegated gatekeepers. Policymakers and financial regulators across
the globe can consider and choose a model that better suits its own regulatory
and supervisory needs.
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INTRODUCTION
As financial technology, or “FinTech” enhances the efficiency of
financial services and has become a fashion in the financial industry, 1
1. For studies that comprehensively discuss the FinTech and its regulatory issues, see,
e.g., Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271 (2016) (arguing against FinTech’s too-early or rigid regulation at this
juncture by analyzing the evolution of FinTech over the past 150 years); Dirk A. Zetzsche et
al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31 (2017) (arguing for a new, smart regulatory approach in the financial
market); J.W. Verret, A Dual Non-Banking System? Or a Non-Dual Non-Banking System?
(George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 17-05, 2017) (examining the Office
of Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) proposal to grant special purpose national bank
charters to rapidly emerging FinTech companies); Tom C.W. Lin, Compliance, Technology,
and Modern Finance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 159 (2016) (analyzing challenges
of financial cybersecurity, the integration of technology and compliance, and the role of
humans in the future of modern finance); Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the
Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129 (2017) (discussing whether the states or
federal government should take the lead in regulating FinTech); Lev Bromberg et al., Fintech
Sandboxes: Achieving a Balance between Regulation and Innovation, 28(4) J. BANKING &
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regulatory technology, or “RegTech,” has also received heightened attention
in recent days. RegTech generally stands for the use of technological
solutions to improve regulatory compliance,2 which holds a great potential
to disrupt the financial industry.3 By adopting the advanced technological
innovations, such as robotics, artificial intelligence, biometrics,
cryptography, blockchain and cloud computing, to facilitate financial
regulation and supervision, RegTech can help both the financial institutions
and regulators in carrying out the regulatory reporting, risk management, and
even behavioral monitoring more effectively. 4 Against this backdrop,
financial regulators across the globe increasingly seek to understand how to
use RegTech to advance their supervisory tools and deal with the regulatory
challenges posed by the rise of FinTech.5
The current studies of RegTech, however, remains in its infancy. Most
of them identify some technologies, such as artificial intelligence, big data
analytics, cloud computing, distributed ledger technology, application
programming interfaces, cryptography, biometrics, etc., and discuss how to
FIN. L. & PRACTICE 314 (2017) (examining differences between different sandbox regimes
and discussing implications to regulators); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 1167 (2018) (sketching out a variety of regulatory responses that well correspond to
FinTech’s particular risks and rewards); Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the
Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2018) (providing a theoretical framework for
understanding and regulating FinTech).
2. For the discussion of the definition of RegTech, see infra Part II.B.
3. For studies discussing the RegTech, see, e.g., Lawrence G. Braxter, Adaptive
Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of
Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L.J. 567 (2016) (explaining how supervising of the modern financial
institutions has become difficult); Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech and the
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37:3 NW. J. OF INT’L L. & BUS. 371 (2017)
(arguing that transformative nature of technology will only be captured by a new approach at
the nexus of data, digital identity, and regulation); Luca Enriques, Financial Supervisors and
RegTech: Four Roles and Four Challenges, 53 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER
(2017) (noting roles financial regulators can play with respect to RegTech), available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3087292 [https://perma.cc/HV4Z-JLK2]; Nizan Gelslevich
Packin, RegTech, Compliance and Technology Judgment Rule, 93:1 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV.
193 (2018) (arguing that society can benefit from RegTech but that it will require carefully
tailored design of the technology).
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. TORONTO CENTRE, FINTECH, REGTECH AND SUPTECH: WHAT THEY MEAN FOR
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 2 (Aug. 2017) https://res.torontocentre.org/guidedocs/FinTech%20
RegTech%20and%20SupTech%20-%20What%20They%20Mean%20for%20Financial%20
Supervision.pdf (observing that “[f]inancial authorities are looking into how to keep their
financial systems stable while harnessing the benefits of FinTech, and existing supervisory
policies, procedures, and resources may no longer be adequate to address a fast changing
landscape. In fact, several supervisory agencies are piloting or implementing new approaches
based on technological solutions developed by two subsets of FinTech . . . . RegTech and
SupTech.”).
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apply technologies to facilitate the financial regulation and supervision. In
our view, these studies mainly focus on the conduct aspect of RegTech.6 Of
equal importance, yet largely overlooked, is the organizational aspect of
RegTech, that is, how the organizational design and culture of a financial
regulator affects its capability and suitability for applying RegTech to
facilitate financial regulation and supervision. After all, technologies do not
function on its own; instead, it is the financial regulators that apply these
advanced technologies. To operate RegTech effectively and appropriately,
the quality and efficiency of financial regulators thus matter. Designing an
optimal organizational structure to help financial regulators adapt to the
development of RegTech is thus crucial for the efficacy of financial
regulation and supervision.
In this Article, we attempt to fill this gap by adopting a three-step
analysis to provide more insights on how to organize a financial regulator in
a RegTech era. We first conduct a comparative analysis of the organizational
models of financial regulators around the world, in which we identify four
major types and compare the different public-private relationship between
them. We then apply the analytical framework of the Transaction Cost
Economics, particularly the Theory of Firm put forward by Ronald Coase
and the comparative institutional approach put forward by Oliver
Williamson, to theorize a spectrum of public-private-partnership for
different organizational models of financial regulators, ranging from a firm-
type of partnership to a contract-type of partnership. Based on this theorized
spectrum, together with the comparative institutional approach, we finally
identify more possible models of public-private-partnership that may help
financial regulators streamline their organizational structure to promote the
adoption of RegTech.
We structure our Article in the following way. In Part II of the paper,
we review the challenges facing financial regulators in this FinTech era to
highlight the increasing importance of RegTech. We then review the current
literature on RegTech, which mainly focuses on identifying the technologies
that may facilitate financial regulation and supervision, including artificial
intelligence, big data analytics, cloud computing, distributed ledger
technology, application programming interfaces, cryptography, biometrics,
etc. We emphasize that these studies focus mainly on the conduct aspect of
RegTech yet overlook the organizational aspect of RegTech.
In Part III, we study the organizational aspect of RegTech through a
public-private lens. We emphasize the need for an uncaptured yet flexible
financial regulator in the RegTech era. We argue that such an entity requires
6. See infra Part II.C.
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the character of a public-private partnership which contains some public
elements to ensure the unbiasedness of the financial regulation and
supervision and some private elements to adapt the financial regulation and
supervision to rapid technological changes. Based on this understanding, we
conduct a comparative analysis of the organizational models of financial
regulators around the world and summarize them into four main categories
based on which entity conducts the financial supervision: (i) the
governmental agency model, which is adopted in most jurisdictions.
Examples include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) in
the United States, the Financial Service Agency (“FSA”) in Japan, etc (ii)
The governmental corporation model. Examples include the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) in the United States, the Financial Conduct
Authority (“FCA”) in the United Kingdom, etc. (iii) The self-regulatory
organization model. Examples include the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”) in the United States. (iv) The delegated gatekeeper
model. Examples include the practice adopted in Taiwan, under which the
governmental regulator mandates the supervisee to retain private yet
independent gatekeepers (such as accounting firms) to certify the legal
compliance of the supervisee. We compare these four organizational models
based on their level of regulatory monopoly, the profit or non-profit nature,
the rigorousness of the decision process, the pay packages, and the level of
independence.
Based on the comparison, in Part IV, we attempt to theorize the
organizational models of financial regulators to explore more possibilities in
the RegTech era. We introduce the firm-contract dichotomy envisaged by
the Transaction Cost Economics, in particular, the Theory of Firm and the
comparative institutional analysis, to theorize a firm-contract spectrum to
depict different models of financial regulators. Based on this theorized
spectrum, we identify additional firm-type and contract-type models of
public-private partnership between government regulators and non-
government actors. We finally apply these new types to substantiate some
additional organizational models of financial regulators that is worth
considering in the RegTech era, including a mixed ownership RegTech
corporation, a contracted RegTech supporter, a quasi-public financial
regulator, or some directly delegated gatekeepers. Part V concludes.
II. REGTECH AND ITS CONDUCT ASPECT
In this Part, we briefly introduce the background of the rise of RegTech
and clarify the concept and terminology of RegTech. Based on these
understandings, we review the current studies of RegTech which center
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mainly around the conduct aspect of RegTech. We finally highlight the
importance of the organizational aspect of RegTech studies.
A. The Challenges in the Financial Sector and the Rise of RegTech
The financial industry is a regulated industry which calls for the
regulator’s involvement. While the rise of FinTech in the recent years
potentially enhances the efficiency in the financial industry, it also poses at
least the following three challenges to financial regulators around the world.
First, financial regulators increasingly need to deal with not only
financial institutions but also nonfinancial firms providing technical services
related to financial services. Due to the extensive use of innovative
technologies and the frequent introduction of novel business and operational
models, financial institutions now face a variety of new sources of risks,
including cyber risks, third-party risks, data privacy risks, etc.7 To address
these risks, financial institutions now turn to other FinTech companies (such
as data analysis companies or cybersecurity companies) and third-party
service providers (such as internet service providers, information technology
supporters, etc.) more actively and frequently. These inter-industry,
sometimes even cross-border, collaborations, in turn, pose additional
informational asymmetry on financial regulators.8 Financial regulators now
face the known unknown and the unknown unknown more frequently than
before and thus urgently need to learn as they regulate.9 Accordingly,
7. FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH
SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES THAT MERIT AUTHORITIES’ ATTENTION 17-21 (Jun 27,
2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D3A-GZR8]
(last visited August 28, 2018) (summarizing a variety of risks that have the potential to
undermine the financial stability).
8. For the related discussion, see generally Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., From FinTech to
TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 NYU J. L. & BUS. 393
(2017-2018) (describing the impact of new FinTech companies with their large pre-existing
non-financial services customer bases); Lev Bromberg at al., Cross-Border Cooperation in
Financial Regulation: Crossing the Fintech Bridge, 13(1) CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 59 (2018)
(noting that financial regulators now face challenges in achieving cross-border regulatory
cooperation due to the rapidly evolving Fintech businesses and the globalization of financial
services markets).
9. Unknown events and risks occur unexpectedly and frequently in a complex system.
There is a growing literature that views the contemporary financial systems as a complex
system, and therefore one should understand its regulatory implications through the lens of
complexity science. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Internationalisation of Law — The
‘Complex’ Case of Bank Regulation, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING,
DECISION-MAKING, PRACTICE AND EDUCATION 3 (Mary Hiscock & William van Caenegem
ed., 2010); Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 469
NATURE 351, 351-55 (2011). Some commentators, therefore, highlight the need to implement
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financial regulators in this new era need to be able to accommodate more
experimental attempts of regulatory actions and iterative process of
supervisory decision-making to give rooms to the regulators to learn, try, and
error.10
Second, financial regulators now face more challenges in balancing
between the introduction of newcomer nonfinancial firms and the protection
of the soundness of incumbent financial institutions. The technological
advancement nowadays allows nonfinancial firms or startups to offer
financial services at an affordable cost, which reduces their entry barriers to
the financial market. This development enables FinTech innovators to bring
financial services to the unbanked and underbanked populations, which
promotes the financial inclusiveness.11 Nevertheless, it could also dampen
the competitiveness of the incumbents and thus jeopardize the safety and
soundness of these incumbents as well as the whole financial system.12
Under the current regulatory regime, financial regulators can control the
competition in the financial market by adopting the licensing regime as a
gatekeeping mechanism.13 It thus begs the question of whether and under
what conditions the regulator should allow newcomers to enter the market
and award them a financial service license. 14 In reaching the answer,
an adaptive approach to financial regulation through which regulators can “learn from the
dynamics of markets.” Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Regulation in the Amoral Bazaar, 128
S. AFR. L. J. 253, 266 (2011).
10. See Cheng-Yun Tsang, Balancing the Governance of the Modern Financial
Ecosystem: A New Governance Perspective and Implications for Market Discipline, 40
HOUSTON J. INT’L L., 531, 610 (2018) (observing that “[a] balanced regulatory and market
power has long been on policymakers’ agendas. Nonetheless, its realization is yet to be seen.
The complex nature of today’s financial markets has suggested a need for more experimental,
flexible and forward-looking measures for the making and implementing of regulations.”);
see also James D. Cox, Iterative Regulation of Securities Markets after Business Roundtable:
A Principles-Based Approach (July 24, 2014), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6032&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/L38P-3TS
D] (observing that “[b]y far the approach most within reach and worthy of consideration is
that whenever regulation is considered it is advisable to do so incrementally with the level
being dictated by the breadth and complexity of the area to be regulated.”).
11. See, e.g., McKinsey Global Institute, DIGITAL FINANCE FOR ALL: POWERING
INCLUSIVE GROWTH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES ix (Sept. 2016) (finding that “[d]igital finance
has the potential to provide access to financial services for 1.6 billion people in emerging
economies.”).
12. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 7, at 11 (observing that “[t]echnology, however,
may reduce costs for new entrants, and help to level the playing field in terms of access to
technology by competing firms, which may themselves be technology leaders. As a result, the
threat of competition may reduce the pricing power of incumbents.”).
13. For a brief analysis of how the entry regulation is carried out through licensing
requirements, see JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 74 (2016).
14. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 1, at 96-98 (“[d]efining the boundaries of competition
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however, financial regulators are plagued by the data availability.15 As the
FSB has noted, “[w]hile the abundance of data is itself at the heart of FinTech
developments, regulators often note having few official data sources to
monitor the sector.”16 Unlike the full-licensed financial institutions, many
nonfinancial firms have not fallen under the existing financial regulatory
parameter and thus undertake no reporting obligations. 17 The financial
regulator thus has limited data and empirical evidence to decide whether
approving new competitors in the market does benefit or harm to the entire
ecosystem.
Third, financial regulators now face more challenges in understanding,
monitoring, and regulating the financial services in the market as the
technologies employed in the market have become more innovative and
complicated. Since the Global Financial Crisis, we have witnessed that the
information, capacity, and resource asymmetry between the regulator and
the regulated increasingly enlarge. For example, financial institutions can
retain the best talents from the market through attractive compensation
packages, whereas the budget and fiscal resources severely constrain
financial regulators.18 To address this gap, financial regulators often resort
to lengthy and complicated regulations as well as enormous penalties for
non-compliance.19 This strategy essentially shifts the burden of reducing
such asymmetry to the regulated, hoping that they will respond to the
heightened regulatory cost by advancing their compliance efficiency.20 In
and innovation is a challenge for regulators. Regulatory sandboxes are an example of
innovation in financial regulation in the context of seeking to balance these competing
objectives.”); see also Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of
Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2018).
15. See Mark Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology Is
Faster than the Law, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 561, 585-89 (2017) (suggesting that lawmaking
and regulatory design needs to become more proactive, dynamic, and responsive as there are
more complex and disruptive technological innovation).
16. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 7, at 59 (Annex H).
17. See id.
18. This gap is likely to be enlarged as banks are now attracting tech talents to help them
undergo the digital transition. See Nicholas Megaw, Banks Seek Tech Talent for Digital Shift,
FIN. TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://on.ft.com/2IVqsuv (detailing the efforts of banks to recruit
tech talent in the current digital transition).
19. Some commentators referred to this phenomenon as “regulatory complexity” and
argue that it will incur “complexity risk.” See Karen Shaw Petrou, Managing Partner, Fed.
Fin. Analytics, Inc., Remarks Prepared for the Securities Industry & Financial Markets
Association: The Complexity-Risk Conundrum: Why SIFIs Can’t Be Both Bullet-Proof and
Profit-Making (Jan. 10, 2012) (transcript available at www.fedfin.com/~fedfin/images/stories
/press_center/sifma_speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BAY-PLTU]).
20. For a related discussion, see generally James Fanto, Dashboard Compliance: Benefit,
Threat, or Both?, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2016).
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response, the regulated financial institutions resort to RegTech solutions to
deal with the growing regulatory complexity and compliance cost.21 This, in
turn, poses further pressure on regulators as they now need to discern the
adequacy and quality of the compliance outcomes generated by these
RegTech solutions. 22 Regulators thus need to level up their regulatory
resources and capability by employing technological solutions to enhance
their regulatory capacity and efficiency. 23 The burden to reduce the
asymmetry now shifts back to financial regulators.
To respond to these regulatory challenges, financial regulators urgently
need to upgrade their technology to improve the regulatory compliance and
supervisory efficiency. RegTech, thus, arrives.24
B. FinTech, RegTech, and SupTech
Although the term RegTech carries a beautiful vision, it has not had a
commonly accepted definition.25 The UK’s Government Office for Science
was arguably the first governmental agency in the world which tried to define
RegTech and specified it as “technologies that can be applied to or used in
regulation, typically to improve efficiency and transparency in regulatory
systems.” 26 Another UK regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority
(“FCA”), somehow concurred this definition but focused on a narrower
scope of technologies, that is, “technologies that may facilitate the delivery
21. Arner et al., supra note 3, at 388-89.
22. TORONTO CENTRE, SupTech: Leveraging Technology for Better Supervision 10-11
(Jul. 2018) (summarizing risks related to the use of RegTech that could impact the
supervisor’s effectiveness and reputation).
23. Id. at 11 (underscoring the need to have in place “infrastructure and organizational
arrangements including computing and storage capacity and integration of data management
and governance frameworks.”).
24. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 22, at 4-8 (highlighting a variety of potential benefits
of SupTech and examples of uses); see also Dirk Broeders & Jermy Prenio, Innovative
Technology in Financial Supervision (Suptech) – The Experience of Early Users, FSI
INSIGHTS ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION NO 9, Financial Stability Institute, 20 (Jul. 2018)
(finding that “[i]nnovative technologies, together with increased data availability, create
scope to strengthen financial supervision. Supervisory agencies around the world recognize
this and are now either using or exploring a wide variety of innovative technologies to support
their work.”)
25. See TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 8 (observing that “there is not yet an agreed
upon definition of RegTech and its typology.”).
26. UK GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, Fin Tech Futures - The UK As A World Leader In
Financial Technologies 62 (Mar. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up
loads/attachment_data/file/413095/gs-15-3-fintech-futures.pdf [https://perma.cc/J45F-Q97
L].
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of regulatory requirements.”27 Comparing these two definitions of RegTech,
the former adopts a broader scope which conceptually encompasses all
technological solutions that can advance the overall regulatory system, while
the latter focuses primarily on technologies which facilitate the process of
regulatory communication between the regulators and the regulated.
The nuances between these two definitions lead the current discussion
of RegTech to two diverse paths. The first one underscores the need to
improve the efficiency and quality of the supervisory process, rulemaking
and legal compliance, 28 whereas the other one emphasizes the need to
improve the ability of financial institutions to understand the regulatory
position and interact with regulators during the compliance process. 29
According to the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”),30 RegTech refers to
“any range of applications of FinTech for regulatory and compliance
requirements and reporting by regulated financial institutions.” 31 This
definition of RegTech generally coincides with the second definition of
RegTech provided by FCA as mentioned previously. In addition to
RegTech, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”) also
came up with a separate concept, the Supervisory Technology, or SupTech,
which refers to the “application of FinTech by supervisory authorities.”32
This understanding of SupTech generally coincides with the first definition
of RegTech provided by the UK’s Government Office for Science as
mentioned previously. The main difference between these two concepts lies
in that SupTech enables financial regulators to “conduct supervisory work
and oversight more effectively and efficiently”33 whereas RegTech assists
financial institutions in complying with laws and regulations.34
The existing literature, however, does not always distinguish the use of
these two terms.35 Therefore, while our analysis focuses mainly on the
27. Feedback Statement, Financial Conduct Authority, Call for Input on Supporting the
Development and Adopters of RegTech 3 (2016).
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id.
30. FIN. STABILITY BD., Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Financial
Services - Market Developments and Financial Stability Implications (Nov. 1, 2017), http://w
ww.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P011117.pdf [https://perma.cc/K348-89EA] (last visited
March 28, 2018) [hereinafter Artificial Intelligence].
31. Id. at 35.
32. See, e.g., Sound Practices - Implications of Fintech Developments for Banks and
Bank Supervisors, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION 4 (Feb. 2018), https://www.bis.o
rg/bcbs/publ/d431.pdf.
33. Id. at 35.
34. Id.
35. Some literature uses “RegTech” to refer to technological solutions used by the
regulators to carry out regulatory missions. See, e.g., Arner et al., supra note 3, at 373
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broader scope SupTech, we use “RegTech” throughout this paper to facilitate
future discussion considering that this is a relatively recognized term.36
C. RegTech Studies from the Conduct Aspect
The current discussion of RegTech focuses mainly on its conduct
aspect. By conduct aspect, we refer to the use of technological solutions to
help financial regulators achieve their regulatory objectives. In a nutshell,
this line of discussion examines the features and developments of different
types of technologies and explores whether and how to apply these
technologies to certain supervisory scenarios or processes. It focuses more
on the actions and measures adopted by a regulator to enhance the
supervisory efficiency and effectiveness. This is distinct from the
organizational aspect of financial regulation and supervision, which instead
focuses on how the organizational design and culture of a financial regulator
affects its priority-setting, resource allocation, and choice of regulatory
approaches.37 We will discuss the organizational aspect of RegTech in the
next Parts.
The studies of the conduct aspect of RegTech typically start from
introducing a stock-take of technologies available for the financial regulator,
identifying the current pain points plaguing the regulator, and then analyzing
how a specific technological solution can address these pain points. Famous
examples include an FSB report in 2017,38 a RegTech report published by
the Institute of International Finance (“IIF”) in 2016,39 and another RegTech
report published by the Toronto Centre in 2017. 40 According to these
reports, the technologies that hold great potential for RegTech solutions may
include artificial intelligence (including machine learning and deep learning
(defining RegTech as “compris[ing] the use of technology, particularly information
technology (IT), in the context of regulatory monitoring, reporting, and compliance.”)
36. As indicated by the Toronto Centre, “RegTech can be divided into two sub-segments:
RegTech for financial institutions and RegTech for supervisors and regulators, or SupTech.”
TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 9.
37. Griffith, for instance, has noted that the culture of an organization may affect how
this organization adopts technology to seek compliance. See generally Sean J Griffith, The
Question Concerning Technology in Compliance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25
(2016).
38. Artificial intelligence, supra note 30.
39. INST. OF INT’L FIN., Regtech in Financial Services: Technology Solutions for
Compliance and Reporting 5-17 (March 2016).
40. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5. Toronto Centre is a world-renowned non-profit
training facility for financial regulators and supervisors in emerging markets. See Toronto
Centre, https://www.torontocentre.org/About [https://perma.cc/9KKM-VSA2] (last visited
Aug. 30, 2018) (explaining the background of the Toronto Centre).
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as its subsets), big data analytics, cloud computing, distributed ledgers (or
blockchain), cryptography, applications programming interfaces (“APIs”),
and biometrics. Each of these technologies provides the functionality that
could address supervisory challenges or facilitate supervisory processes.
Below we briefly introduce each technology.
a. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is a technology that gives a computer the
ability to perform tasks that traditionally require human actions, such as
problem-solving, speech recognition, visual perception, decision-making,
language translation, etc.41 To achieve this function, AI typically employs
the technology of machine learning, that is, the computer learning without
being programmed for such.42 Specifically, machine learning is a “method
of designing a sequence of actions to solve a problem . . . which optimize
automatically through experience and with limited or no human
intervention.”43 Machine learning can analyze non-rational or non-program-
coded data to recognize patterns that are usually unrecognizable to the
human brain.44 It can further facilitate the classification and regression
analysis. 45 For example, classification algorithms can identify the
probability of the data and group the data into a finite number of categories
based on the identified probability.46 Regression algorithms, in contrast, can
progress the classification algorithm and estimate an infinite yet continuous
set of possible outcomes with a confidence interval. 47 With these functions,
financial regulators can apply machine learning to optimize and categorize
the data as well as predict the outcome. To be noted, machine learning
cannot infer the causality.48 For example, machine learning can identify
whether the debt of a company will reach specific investment grade or yield
level, but it cannot identify what factors led to that grade or level.49
We can classify machine learning algorithms into four categories based
on the level of human intervention required for labeling the data. The first
category is “supervised learning,” where the human supervisor labels the
data before the algorithm processes the dataset. For example, the human
41. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 4; Artificial intelligence, supra note 30, at 4.
42. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 4.
43. Artificial intelligence, supra note 30, at 4.
44. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 4; Artificial intelligence, supra note 30, at 6.




49. Id. at 5.
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supervisor chooses the sample data points of a dataset, classifies them into
fraudulent and non-fraudulent ones, and provides the labelled sample data to
the algorithm. The algorithm will then learn the classification from the
labelled sample data, predict the labelling pattern, and finally complete the
labels for the rest of the data. 50 The second category is “unsupervised
learning,” where the algorithm can recognize the patterns in the data and
discover the cluster in the data without assistance from human labelling.51
The third category is “reinforcement learning,” which takes the form
between the supervised and unsupervised learning. The algorithm processes
the unlabelled data first, and then it learns how to recognize the pattern based
on the human feedback of its processing result.52 The fourth category is
“deep learning,” which imitates the function of human brains through the
algorithm and applies the supervised, unsupervised, or reinforcement
learning.53 In recent years, deep learning has made remarkable progress in
image recognition such as recognizing cars and counting them based on a
satellite image. It has also made significant progress in the field of natural
language processing (“NLP”).54
The RegTech literature generally believes that AI holds the potential to
facilitate the regulatory compliance and supervisory process. The increased
volume of data has plagued the current prudential regulations while the AI’s
ability in analyzing a large volume of data helps resolve this challenge.55
Specifically, AI can improve the accuracy of risk models by identifying
complex and nonlinear patterns in large datasets and create models that
enable more in-depth insights into the data.56 Some financial regulators have
applied AI in model validation to detect anomalous projections generated by
its models of stress tests, while others have applied it to model the capital
market business for bank stress testings.57 Financial regulators can further
use AI to estimate the market impact of prices and timing on trades more
accurately to minimize trade costs.58
AI can also assist in enforcing the regulatory compliance and conduct
regulations. Financial regulators can apply machine learning, together with





54. NLP enables computers to read and produce written text. Further, NLP combined
with voice recognition enables computers to read and speak.
55. Artificial intelligence., supra note 30, at 16.
56. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 13.
57. Artificial intelligence, supra note 30, at 16-17.
58. Id. at 17.
368 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 21:2
laundering (“AML”), or counter-terrorism financing (“CFT”). 59 These
technologies can analyze the unstructured data, such as phone conversations,
emails, and documents, to efficiently monitor customer conduct.60 They can
further calculate risk scores to identify the customers that warrant further
scrutiny by operating ongoing periodic checks on different sources of data,
such as public registers of offenders, social media and online forums.61 It
can also help financial institutions to conduct the suitability analysis to avoid
mis-selling.62
AI can further improve consumer protection by facilitating the
communication between financial institutions and financial consumers. For
example, it can help financial institutions to analyze customer complaints
and identify the causes more efficiently, which can prevent potential
consumer disputes.63 Furthermore, chatbots, a machine learning software
that provides customer service to solve consumer problems, can also help
financial institutions understand their customers better.64 For example, the
current chatbots have been capable of not only providing simple information
or alerts but also advising and prompting customers to act.65
b. Big Data Analytics and Cloud Computing
Big data broadly refers to the vast amount of data, unstructured or
structured, that traditional analytical tools cannot process.66 We can apply
other technologies to analyze the big data. For example, we can apply
machine learning to analyze the big data to “find patterns in large amounts
of data (big data analytics) from increasingly diverse and innovative
sources.”67 We can further apply cloud computing to big data to increase the
“interconnectedness of information technology resources.”68
Cloud computing is a data center on the Internet that stores and
processes data, which can refrain from using the servers and computers
owned and locally maintained by each user of the cloud.69 It has advanced
the ability of financial institutions to generate, store, manage, and use data
59. Id. at 23.
60. Id. at 20.
61. Id.
62. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 13.
63. Id.
64. Artificial intelligence, supra note 30, at 14-15.
65. Id.
66. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 4; Artificial intelligence, supra note 30, at 4.
67. Artificial intelligence, supra note 30, at 4.
68. Id. at 6.
69. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 5.
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with lower costs and higher flexibility. 70 It can also help financial
institutions aggregate and manage their risk data to ensure the regulatory
compliance. 71 Financial institutions can also use cloud computing to
integrate their different parts of businesses and optimize the data processing
by, for instance, establishing a central data repository on the cloud. 72
Furthermore, financial regulators can apply cloud computing to create a
standardized and shared utility to standardize the data and share it with both
financial institutions and the regulators to simplify compliance. 73
c. Distributed Ledger Technology
Distributed ledger technology, or DLT (often understood as
“Blockchain”74), is, in essence, a database shared between multiple parties to
initiate, execute and record transactions based on some consensus
mechanisms.75 Specifically, the parties can create a smart contract, which is,
in essence, a computer protocol that can self-execute the transaction
automatically upon the satisfaction of pre-defined conditions. 76 Smart
contracts can, in turn, increase the transparency of financial contracts, reduce
settlement risks, increase the post-trade efficiency, and lockup capital
through real-time settlement.77
DLT has the advantage in preventing cyber attacks and data alteration
because the data is not controlled by a central trusted party but distributed
among all parties.78 It also has immense potential to help financial regulators
achieve real-time monitoring, automated supervisory reporting, and
enforcement. It is also particularly suitable for building the infrastructures,
70. Id.
71. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 12.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Blockchain is a type of DLT, which the ledger of transactions is as a series of blocks
of data linked together through cryptography. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 5. For the
discussion of the blockchain technology and its application, see, e.g., Catherine Martin
Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and Enforcement in Banking,
Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139 (2016); Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The Distributed
Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, U. ILL. L. REV. 1361 (2018); Carla
L. Reyes et al., Distributed Governance, 59(1) WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2017).
75. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 4.
76. Id. at 4-5.
77. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 15. For a discussion of the smart contract, see,
e.g., Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
263 (2017) (explaining benefits of block-chain stored smart contracts in avoiding costs of
traditional drafting, ambiguity in written language, and costly judicial intervention).
78. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 4.
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such as a digital identity regime, to further develop RegTech.79
d. Application Programming Interfaces
Application programming interfaces, or APIs, are rules that guide
software programs to interact with each other.80 APIs are published publicly,
which helps integrate the standards and innovate the functionality. They can
facilitate the automation and standardization of data and thus streamline the
compliance work for financial institutions.81 More specifically, they can
help regulators build up a standardized communication of the supervisory
data and promote industry-wide regulatory standards that can apply to many
proposed RegTech solutions.
e. Cryptography
Cryptography is a technology that transforms information into a secure
format; the most notable example is encryption. 82 Cryptography can
facilitate the compliance of data sharing regulations. Specifically, it can
resolve the data security concern for big datasets by providing customized
access control.83 Financial regulators, for example, can establish a Data
Storage Cell-Level Security, which is an application of the cryptography that
only allows authorized parties (such as clients and regulators) to access
permitted information on the shared data pool.84 Cell-level security can
further analyze the data and identify the property, object and access type of
the data to accelerate the data search.85
f. Biometrics
Biometrics is a technology that uses the computer to process and store
unique human characteristics such as fingerprint, iris, voice, and face.86
Combined with AI and machine learning, biometrics can provide new forms
79. For a discussion, see, e.g., Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial
Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 837 (2015) (describing advantages of distributed ledger technology that can help
develop RegTech).
80. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 4; INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 15.
81. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 15.
82. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 5.
83. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 12.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 16.
86. TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 5.
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of identification, such as fingerprint and iris scanning, face recognition,
remote passport recognition, and eIDs.87 Financial institutions can use these
new forms of identification to verify the identity of their customers more
efficiently and securely. Biometrics can further help financial institutions to
conduct the customer due diligence (“CDD”) to satisfy their Know Your
Clients (“KYC”) obligations as required under the AML sanction or the
counter-terrorist financing (“CTF”) sanction. 88 Moreover, the different
language used in different jurisdictions often results in interpretation hurdles,
which makes it difficult for financial institutions to conduct KYC
compliance; biometrics can help overcome this barrier.89
D. From the Conduct Aspect to the Organizational Aspect of RegTech
Admittedly, the technologies as mentioned previously possess a huge
potential to fundamentally change the way of financial regulation and
supervision and improve the regulatory efficiency. However, such an ideal
scenario will not come true automatically.90 Technologies do not function
on their own; instead, it is the financial regulators that apply these advanced
technologies. To operate RegTech effectively and appropriately, the quality
and efficiency of financial regulators thus matter.
The quality and efficiency of financial regulators depend on many
aspects, including the organizational design, regulatory model, and
institutional culture of a financial regulator. It is crucial that these aspects of
a financial regulator allow it to integrate technology into their policymaking
and capacity building continually.91 As technologies upgrade quickly and
frequently, financial regulators should also be adequately agile, forward-
87. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 14.
88. For a discussion, see generally Douglas W. Arner et al., The Identity Challenge in
Finance: From Analogue Identity to Digitized Identification to Digital KYC Utilities, EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1 (2019) (describing the importance of understanding client identity for
financial institutions to protect against fraud and improve risk management).
89. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 10.
90. To fully materialize the potential of RegTech, financial regulators face many
challenges. See TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 22, at 8-10 (detailing multiple risks and
challenges to expect when adopting SupTech); see also Broeders & Prenio, supra note 24, at
1 (finding that “[a]gencies face a number of challenges in developing or using suptech
applications. Some of these issues relate to computational capacity constraints, increased
operational risks, including cyberrisk, data quality, finding the right talent, management
support and buy-in from supervision units, and rigid rules in project management.”).
91. See TORONTO CENTRE, supra note 5, at 15 (concluding that “[p]aradigm shifts can
only succeed with the right mindset and leadership at regulatory and supervisory authorities,
since they require a profound cultural transformation. Authorities need first to recognize that
they must change and be strategic in reviewing existing approaches, organizational structures,
IT systems, and technical skills.”).
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looking, and technology-enabled. Importantly, financial regulators should
be able to efficiently adapt to a new technology that can help improve
regulatory efficacy. Specifically, to contain both the FinTech and RegTech,
the organizational design, regulatory model, and institutional culture of a
financial regulator should allow iterative regulatory experimentation, enable
large-scale supervisory data-collection, and promote the technological
literacy of regulators.
Accordingly, we need to rethink the organizational foundation of
financial regulators on which the current financial system is built. The
current RegTech studies, as illustrated above in II.C., mostly focus on how
to apply various technologies to facilitate the financial regulation and
supervision from a conduct aspect, which admittedly have merits in
identifying the direction for how to implement RegTech in the future. Of
equal importance, however, is the organizational aspect of RegTech; that is,
how to implement RegTech and through what organizational design to
employ RegTech solutions to regulate and supervise the modern financial
system. This organizational aspect of financial regulation and supervision
remains largely overlooked in the current RegTech literature. This paper
attempts to fill this void.
III. A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS OF FINANCIAL REGULATORS
In this Part, we introduce a public-private approach for analyzing the
organizational characteristics of a financial regulator. We emphasize the
need for an accountable yet flexible regulator in the RegTech era. We also
argue that such a regulator requires the character of a public-private
partnership, which contains some public elements which ensure the
unbiasedness of financial supervision and some private elements which
adapt financial regulation and supervision to rapid technological changes.
The present is the foundation of the future. To explore an appropriate
organizational model of financial regulators for implementing the RegTech,
we start by reviewing the current organizational models adopted around the
world. We identify four major models: (i) the government agency model,
(ii) the government corporation model, (iii) the self-regulatory organization
model, and (iv) the delegated gatekeeper model. By comparing the
organizational characteristics of these models, we lay down an intellectual
foundation for innovating other potential models of financial regulators in
the RegTech era.
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A. A Public-Private Approach for Analyzing the Organizational
Models of Financial Regulators
To adopt RegTech to facilitate financial regulation and supervision
competently, a financial regulator requires many complementary
organizational characteristics. A financial regulator can play at least four
different roles in RegTech: a developer of RegTech products, a buyer of
RegTech products developed by others, a facilitator and coordinator of
market developments, and the supervisor of RegTech firms.92 To assume
these roles, a financial regulator needs to upgrade its technology persistently.
This, in turn, requires it to be innovative and creative to design the needed
RegTech products, or to at least keep up with the pace of private RegTech
firms. A financial regulator also has to be adaptive and flexible to remain as
evolving as the financial industry. It further has to recruit professional and
sophisticated talents to ably supervise the complex financial market. In the
meantime, the financial regulator has to be independent and unbiased to
balance the interests of existing market players, prospective market entrants,
the development of the overall financial industry, the stability of the financial
system, and other public interests. All of these organizational characteristics
are the premise conditions for a financial regulator to maneuver RegTech
effectively.
Conventional financial regulators often lack many of these premise
conditions, however. Instead of being innovative and creative, they often
have less motivation to adopt changes. Instead of being adaptive and flexible
to the financial environment, they are often risk-averse and suffer from the
status quo bias. Instead of being as sophisticated and professional as market
players, they are often outsmarted by market players, especially in respect of
technology.93 These realities inevitably hinder financial regulators from
adopting RegTech efficiently.
Conventional financial regulators have these limits essentially due to
their public nature. As a public entity, they are monopolies in the “market”
of financial regulation and supervision, facing no competition from other
service suppliers.94 The lack of competition, in turn, leads to less motivation.
Besides, as a public entity, they do not pursue profits from their activities.
Since they reap no profit from their activities, they have less incentive to take
the risk to make changes, because they gain little even when the changes pay
off. Moreover, as a public entity, they possess the public authority and
receive the mandate to exercise it in the interest of the public. Since they
92. Enriques, supra note 3, at 5.
93. Id. at 5-8.
94. See infra Part III.B.a.i.
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face the scrutiny and pressure from the public as well as the due process
mandate, their decision process is more rigorous and thus less adaptive to the
changing environment. Last but not the least, as public entities, their pay
system is often subject to the government budget, which prevents them from
offering their staff a pay package as lucrative as that offered by private
sectors.95 Therefore, they often find it difficult to recruit top talents in the
industry, which compromises their level of sophistication and profession.96
In contrast, these missing pieces are often the relative advantages of private
entities. Private sectors are competitive, profit-driven, less accountable to
the public, and highly-paid, which generally make them more receptive to
innovative ideas and adaptive to market and technological changes.
Nevertheless, financial laws refrain from assigning the task of financial
regulation and supervision to private entities for a reason. Financial
regulation and supervision involve the exercise of public authority for the
interest of the public. It imposes discipline on the financial market to
maximize the social welfare by mitigating the market failure problems in the
financial market, such as the informational asymmetry, externality, etc.
Private sectors, in contrast, are private-interest-concerned, concerning few,
if any, interests of the general public. There is a real concern that if laws
vest private entities with the regulatory and supervisory authority, these
private supervisors will pursue their interest with little, if any, regard of other
spillover effects.97 Therefore, while private sectors are relatively equipped
for adopting RegTech, they could have less incentive to adopt it in the public
interest. We thus face a tradeoff between capability and incentive.
To be sure, this public-private dilemma is not unique to RegTech. It is
instead an everlasting issue of financial regulation and supervision. The
emergence of RegTech, however, highlights this dilemma to the extent that
RegTech calls for a more innovative, adaptive, flexible, and professional
financial regulator. To address this dilemma, the next question follows: is it
possible to have new organizational models of financial regulators which
carry both the public and private natures, and thus combine both the
advantages of public and private sectors?
B. The Typology of the Organizational Models of Financial
Regulators
A comparative institutional study of the current organizational models
95. See infra Part III.B.a.iv.
96. Enriques, supra note 3, at 5-8.
97. As will be discussed later, commentators have observed this phenomenon in the case
of SROs which are comprised of private industries. See infra note Part III.B.c.
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of financial regulators may shed us some light. The current studies of
financial regulators mainly focus on the cost and benefit of a fragmented
regulatory system, with the United States’ model as the major research
subject, 98 the relative relationship between the central bank and other
financial regulatory bodies,99 the independence of financial regulators,100 etc.
Relatively few studies discuss the organizational models of financial
regulators from a public-private perspective.101
Major countries have developed different organizational models of
financial regulators that go beyond a simple governmental agency model. In
98. See, e.g., Hadar Y. Jabotinsky, The Federal Structure of Financial Supervision: A
Story of Information-Flow, 22(1) STAN. J.L. BUS & FIN 52 (2017); Adam J. Levitin, The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321
(2013).
99. See, e.g., Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About
Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8(2) EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 237 (2007); Howell Jackson, Learning from Eddy: A Meditation upon
Organizational Reform of Financial Supervision in Europe, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY
LAW AND FIN. REG. 523 (Michel Tison et al., ed., 2009); Donato Masciandaro & Davide
Romelli, Twin Peaks and Central Banks: Economics, Political Economy and Comparative
Analysis (Universita Bocconi Centre for Applied Research on International Markets, Banking,
Finance, and Regulation Working Paper, No. 68, 2017); Andrew D Schmulow, The Four
Methods of Financial System Regulation: An International Comparative Survey (University
of Western Australia-Faculty of Law Research Paper, 2017).
100. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation,
101 CAL L. REV. 327 (2013); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98(4) CORNELL L. Rev 769 (2013); Donato Masciandaro
& Davide Romelli, Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence (Universita
Bocconi Centre for Applied Research on International Markets, Banking, Finance, and
Regulation Working Paper, No. 71, 2018).
101. Some studies on self-regulatory organizations touch upon this issue. See, e.g.,
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (2013) (providing a comprehensive account of the public-private difference in securities
regulation); Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 573
(2017). The New Governance scholarship also addressed the public-private relationship of
financial regulations. See Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the
Financial Industry, 35(3) BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665 (2010); Saule Omarova, Wall Street as
Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411
(2011); Cristie Ford, Macro- and Micro-Level Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation,
44 UBC L. REV. 589 (2011); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-
Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2008); Annelise Riles, Is New Governance
the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation?, 31 MONETARY & ECON. STUD. 65
(2013). This thread of scholarship, however, focuses more on how to create regulation
through the collaboration between public and private actors, as opposed to how to allocate the
regulatory and supervisory roles between public and private actors. Our analysis in this
Article fills this void. See Tsang, supra note 10, at 578-99 (providing a comprehensive
analysis of the New Governance theory and its application in the context of financial
regulation).
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this subsection, we introduce and compare different organizational models
of financial regulators around the world.
a. The Government Agency Model
Most financial regulators around the world are governmental agencies.
In the United States, major financial regulators such as the Federal Reserve
in charge of bank holding companies and state banks that are members of the
federal system,102 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) in
charge of national banks,103 and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) in charge of securities brokers and dealers, investment companies,
and investment advisers,104 etc. are all government agencies. Elsewhere, the
Financial Services Agency (“FSA”) in charge of all financial institutions in
Japan, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) in charge of all
financial institutions in Singapore, and the Chinese Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission (“CBIRC”) in charge of banks and insurers in
China, etc. are also government agencies.
These government agency regulators typically possess some general
characteristics, including the regulatory monopoly, non-profit-seeking
nature, rigorous decision-making process, unattractive salary, and
independence of industries as opposed to politicians.105 These organizational
characteristics are useful benchmarks for us to discuss other models of
financial regulators.
i. The Regulatory Monopoly
Government agencies are mostly monopolistic in the sense that they
barely have competitors.106 Nowadays, many countries adopt the so-called
integrated or unified approach for structuring their financial regulatory
regime, under which only a single financial regulator is responsible for
supervising all the financial institutions in its territory. Japan, Singapore,
and Germany are all examples. 107 For example, in Japan, the FSA is
102. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 94-95 (6th
ed., 2017).
103. Id. at 92-93.
104. Id. at 677-78.
105. To be sure, different government agencies exhibit difference in many aspects as well.
For a discussion of the different organizational characteristics of the U.S. financial regulators,
see Levitin, supra note 98, at 343.
106. The fragmented regulatory structure in the United States is instead an exception. For
the related discussion, see Levintin, supra note 98, at 343.
107. For an introduction, see Schmulow, supra note 99, at 155-58.
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responsible for ensuring the stability of finance in Japan, protecting
depositors, insurers, securities investors, etc., and promoting finance.108 To
implement this mandate, the FSA is entitled to supervise all financial
institutions in Japan.109
Instead of adopting an integrated regulatory framework, some countries
establish multiple agencies for supervising different financial institutions. In
these countries, each government agency regulator remains a monopoly:
since each of them is in charge of an exclusive group of financial institutions,
each of their supervisory power within its mandate is unfettered by other
regulators. For example, in China, it used to maintain a Three Commissions
Model which established the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission
(“CBRC”), Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”), and
Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission (“CIRC”) to share the
supervision of Chinese financial institutions. Each Commission, however,
had its mission: CBRC supervised banking financial institutions,110 CSRC
supervised securities firms and securities markets,111 while CIRC supervised
insurance companies, 112 and each of them did not cross-supervise the
financial institutions supervised by others. Therefore, within its mandate,
each financial regulator was a monopoly. Such monopolistic status remains
lasting after the restructuring in 2018 which merges CBRC and CIRC into a
single regulator, the CBIRC.
Regulatory monopoly is advantageous to the extent that it prevents the
regulated from arbitraging between different regulators, which, in turn,
prevents the potential of a race to the bottom in regulation and supervision.113
It could also enhance the regulatory efficiency because of the economies of
scale.114 The disadvantage, however, is that regulators have less incentive to
improve their work quality and are thus less responsive to industrial needs.115
There is also a concern that regulatory monopoly might lead to regulatory
capture by giant financial conglomerates at the expense of smaller
specialized firms.116
108. FSA ESTABLISHMENT ACT, art. 3 (Japan).
109. Id. at art. 4.
110. BANKING INDUSTRY SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION ACT, art. 2 (Ch).
111. SECURITIES ACT, arts. 7, 178, 179 (Ch).
112. INSURANCE ACT, art. 9 (Ch).
113. For the studies raising the regulatory arbitrage concern, see Eugene A. Ludwig,
Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and
Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29(1) YALE J. REG. 181, 189-90 (2012).
114. Jackson, supra note 99, at 526.
115. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 102, at 98-99.
116. Jackson, supra note 99, at 527.
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ii. The Non-Profit Nature
Government agencies are not-for-profit entities and thus do not pursue
maximized profits as their main priority. This point has two implications.
On the one hand, government agencies typically operate under a given
budget. They submit their estimated annual budget at the beginning of the
fiscal year. After approval by the legislative or executive branch in charge
of their budget, they operate and spend by this budget. On the other hand,
government agencies do not possess a distribution mechanism that
distributes their operational profits to anyone. Therefore, they face no need
to minimize their budgetary spending. To the contrary, they are even
encouraged to maximize their spending within this budgetary limit. This is
because any under-spending might lead to a budget cut in the next fiscal year,
and government agencies prefer to maximize their budgets to have more
resources and discretion. Under this setting, the operation of government
agencies tends to be budget-driven rather than profit-driven.
To be sure, although government agencies are not profit-driven, they do
make profits. Many financial regulators create revenues from their activities.
For example, they collect regulatory fees from the entities they oversee.
Some financial regulators even finance their activities with these revenues
rather than with appropriations.117 For example, OCC’s revenue comes
mainly from the assessments and fees paid by banks, the income on
investments in non-marketable U.S. Treasury securities, and the rental
income and reimbursable activities from other federal entities. 118 The
collected fund is not subject to apportionment, and the OCC also does not
receive congressional appropriations to fund any of its operations. 119
However, making profits is not the mandate of these government agencies,
and the agencies generally remain unmotivated to make profits because they
are not entitled to distribute the profits to, for instance, their management or
staff. Therefore, they continue to operate under a given budget as determined
by the assessment and fees; the major difference is merely that their
operation is on a self-sufficiency basis. In sum, although these government
agencies can make profits, they do not pursue profits.
The advantage of the non-profit nature of government agencies is that
government agency regulators are less concerned with their own commercial
interests; thus, they are more inclined to spend for the public’s interest. After
117. For instance, OCC funds itself from the fees paid by national banks, and the Federal
Reserve pays its expenses from the interest earned on its government securities portfolio.
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 102, at 93.
118. 12 U.S.C. §16.
119. Id.
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all, saving the budget in their pocket does them no good. Therefore, when
they consider introducing the RegTech, commercial reasonability is less of
a negative factor. The disadvantage, however, is that government agency
regulators face budgetary constraints and motivational limits. First of all,
introducing the RegTech requires a tremendous amount of investment in
hardware, software, and human resources, which is not necessarily
affordable for many government agency regulators. Moreover, introducing
the RegTech invites disruptive innovation to the government agency
regulator because they might face an unfamiliar regulatory method. Absent
the profit motivation, government agency regulators might have less
incentive to take the risks of changes to pursue such innovation. Therefore,
unless they face substantial external pressure, they might be comfortable
with the status quo and feel less inclined to introduce RegTech solutions even
though their budgets permit it. Furthermore, many innovations require a
sophisticated business model to make its research, development, and mass
application cost-efficient, and a not-for-profit financial regulator might lack
such a model.
iii. The Rigorous Decision-making Process
The decision-making process of government agencies is typically
rigorous and stringent. As a government entity possessing public authority,
government agencies have to abide by the constitutional requirement of due
process. This may include hearing, notice-and-comment, and others.
Recently, many financial regulators have begun to face an additional
requirement: the cost and benefit requirement.120 All of these factors render
the decision-making process of government agencies inevitably lengthy.
The advantage of such a rigorous process is that it helps to ensure that
regulatory decisions are unbiased and comprehensive. Under the due
process mandate, different interest groups may have more procedural
opportunity to voice their concerns. Through conducting the cost-benefit
analysis, the final rule promulgated by the regulators might consider and
reconcile conflicting interests more. The disadvantage, however, is that this
prolongs the decision process, which jeopardizes the adaptability and
flexibility of regulatory decision-making. In the rapidly-changing world of
finance, “better late than never” does not always hold true.
120. For studies related to the cost and benefit analysis of financial regulations, see John
C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications,
124 YALE L. J. 882 (2015); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in
Financial Regulation, 43(2) J. LEG. STUD. 351 (2014).
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iv. The Uncompetitive Pay Package
The budget limits and rigid pay rules further result in the under-staffing
problem of financial regulators, which, in turn, leads to under-enforcement.
Because of budget constraints, government agencies typically offer less than
lucrative pay to their staff. For instance, a financial regulator requires a
professional staff composed of lawyers, but a government agency can hardly
pay its staff as generously as a private law firm does.121 This problem is
expected to become even more acute in the era of RegTech, which requires
professional staff composed of engineers or even data scientists.122
For example, in principle, the OCC fixes the compensation and number
of all its employees, subject to additional compensation and benefits per
relevant laws.123 According to OCC’s 2018 Base Salary Structure, the basic
annual salary band of an OCC attorney is between USD 51,119 and USD
183,492, while that of an OCC manager and executive is between USD
78,572 and USD 282,500, with other potentially applicable salary increases
such as merit pay increase, merit bonus, special increase, promotional
increase, and Step 2 increase.124 While these figures are decent in and of
themselves and are significantly higher than that of ordinary federal civil
agency officials of in the United States,125 they are nowhere close to the
annual income of a private attorney or a private executive in the United
States.
In the absence of competitive pay packages, government agency
regulators generally find it difficult to recruit or retain the top talent in their
staff and management team. Absent an adequate amount of top talent, they
can hardly be as innovative or sophisticated in adopting the most high-end
RegTech, especially when compared to the private financial institutions that
can afford more appealing compensation and benefits packages to attract top
talent.
121. Enriques, supra note 3, at 5-6 (noting, while the salary package is unattractive, the
implicit benefits that government agency staff could procure, such as the network and the
supervisory training, may be more than humble).
122. Id. at 6-8.
123. 12 U.S.C §482.
124. OCC Salary Structure, https://careers.occ.gov/pay-and-benefits/salary/index-occ-
salary-structure.html [https://perma.cc/SNZ7-7ZFV] (last visited June 25, 2018).
125. See Salary Table 2018-GS, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/sa
laries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2018/GS.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHG4-WLA7] (last visited
June 25, 2018). According to the OCC, the maximum annual salary of a federal civilian
agency official in 2018 is USD 136,659.
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v. The Political Capture
Last but not least, government agencies are often subject to more
political capture in at least two aspects: budget and personnel. As mentioned
previously, the budget of many government agency regulators is part of the
government’s overall budget and is subject to the legislative branch’s
approval. Because government agency regulators fear that the government
or the legislative branch might cut its budget, they tend to be less resistant to
politicians’ comments or suggestions.
Regarding personnel, the heads of government agencies are often
politically appointed, subject to endorsement by the executive branch or even
the legislative branch. For example, Japan designs its FSA as an independent
agency that exercises its power independently.126 That said, the Japanese
FSA is a commission composed of the FSA chairperson and two
commissioners,127 who are appointed by the Premier as approved by the
House of Councillors and House of Representatives. 128 Therefore, the
personnel of the FSA remains highly susceptible to political pressure. The
primary mechanism for ensuring its political independence is the three-year
term protection awarded to the chairperson and commissioners.129 Such term
protection, however, has two caveats. First, notwithstanding the term
protection, the Premier can dismiss the FSA chairperson and/or
commissioners if he/she is found psychologically or physically incapable of
performing his/her duties, in breach of his/her obligations, or involved in any
other circumstances where he/she is found inappropriate to continue serving
the position.130 Considering that the reasons for dismissal are quite abstract
and flexible, the term protection awarded to the FSA chairperson and
commissioners is less reliable than it appears. Second, the chairperson and
commissioners can be reappointed, 131 subject to the same appointment
process. Therefore, the chairperson and commissioners who are interested
in reappointment will need to consider the preference of the Cabinet and the
Diet even after their appointment.
We wish to emphasize that even independent financial regulators are
subject to a significant degree of political influence. There are recurring
debates about the cost and benefit of independent agencies132 and whether
126. FSA ESTABLISHMENT ACT, ch. 3, art. 9 (Japan).
127. Id. ch. 3, art. 10.
128. Id. ch. 3, art. 12.
129. Id. ch. 3, art. 13.
130. Id. ch. 3, arts. 14-15.
131. Id. ch. 3, art. 13.
132. For a discussion of the difference between independent agencies and executive
agencies, see generally Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent
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financial regulators should be independent.133 Independent agencies are
more independent to the extent that their heads are entitled to term
protection134 and their operation is often self-financing. Nevertheless, the
heads of these independent financial regulators often remain politically
appointed. Japan’s FSA has provided a good example. Therefore, the
political influence still remains, albeit to a lesser degree.
The relative budgetary freedom does not entirely ward off political
capture either. For example, as illustrated above, the OCC possesses relative
budgetary autonomy. Its Comptroller is also entitled to five-year term
protection.135 That said, OCC is not immune from political capture. For one
thing, the Comptroller of the OCC is appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.136 Moreover, the OCC is essentially a
bureau of the Department of the Treasury137 and its operation depends upon
the Treasury to a significant extent. Although in principle, the Treasury shall
not delay or prevent the issuance of any rule or regulation by the OCC and
shall intervene in any matter before the OCC, the OCC and its Comptroller
remain obliged to perform their duties under the general direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury. 138 Therefore, the OCC remains significantly
susceptible to political influence.
The political capture of government agency regulators could be
advantageous to the extent that it prevents these regulators from being
captured by a single interest group, especially the financial institutions they
regulate. This mitigates the potential bias in financial regulation and
supervision. It also ensures the accountability of government agency
regulators to the general public welfare. However, it could be
disadvantageous to the extent that the regulator has to navigate different
interests in the political branches. These political influences might slow
down the regulator’s decision-making process and obstruct them from
pursuing a single direction at full speed. Regulators might further have to
compromise their expert judgment to respect and harmonize with other non-
expert, yet politically popular opinions.
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98(4) CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013).
133. See supra note 97.
134. Such as the case of FSA as illustrated above.
135. 12 U.S.C. §2.
136. Id.
137. 12 U.S.C. §1.
138. 12 U.S.C. Code §2.
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b. The Government Corporation Model
While most financial regulators around the world adopt the government
agency model, some of them differ by adopting the government corporation
model, under which the financial regulator is a corporation wholly owned by
the government.139 Famous examples include the FDIC in charge of state
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System in the United
States140 and the FCA in charge of conduct regulation of financial institutions
in the United Kingdom.141
In general, government corporation regulators possess similar
organizational features with government agency regulators in various
aspects. First, similar to government agency regulators, government
corporation regulators often enjoy the regulatory monopoly as well. For
example, the FCA is the financial conduct regulator that regulates consumer
protection, integrity, and competition in relevant financial markets in the
United Kingdom.142 Within this mandate, it faces little or no competition
from other financial regulators, which is similar to the case of Japan’s
FSA.143
Second, similar to government agency regulators, government
corporation regulators do not pursue profits because they do not have a
distribution mechanism in place. That said, they generally maintain self-
sufficient budgets thanks to the corporate structure. For example, the FDIC
operates on a self-sufficiency basis. The banking industry in the United
States fully funds the FDIC’s operation; thus, taxpayers need not bear any
costs of running the FDIC. 144 The FDIC will also assess the cost of
139. For a general discussion of government corporations, see generally A. Michael
Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543 (1995). See
also Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang, Government Ownership of Banks: A Curse or a Blessing for the
United States?, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
140. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, §9(a) (U.S.). See also CARNELL ET AL., supra note
102, at 93-94.
141. Financial Services and Markets Act, Chapter 1, §1A (U.K.) (noting that FCA is a
corporate body).
142. Id. Chapter 1, §§1B & 1F.
143. The FDIC, in contrast, is a different case due to the United States’ fragmented
regulatory structure. The FDIC is in charge of state banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System. Since there are other multiple financial supervisors in the United States that
are in charge of different types of banks, a bank’s founders in the United States can choose
whether to incorporate their banks as state banks and whether to join the Federal Reserve
System in order to choose the financial supervisor. This introduces the supervisory
competition in the United States. Therefore, the FDIC is less monopolistic. That said, this is
due to the United States’ unique supervisory structure, not the government corporation nature
of the FDIC.
144. American Bankers Association, Who Pays Deposit Insurance (Mar. 2016), https://
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conducting any regular or special examinations of depository institutions
from the examined institution to meet the expenses in carrying out such
examinations.145 Similarly, the FCA also finances its operations using the
fees collected from its chartered firms.146 Although government corporation
regulators do not pursue profits, their operation is inevitably limited by their
operating revenue.
Third, the decision-making process of government corporation
regulators is generally as rigorous as that of government agency regulators.
Government corporations are functionally equivalent to government
agencies. The FDIC itself acknowledges that it is “an independent agency
created by the Congress to maintain stability and public confidence in the
nation’s financial system.”147 The FCA also acknowledges that it is “an
independent financial regulator, accountable to the Treasury and
Parliament.” 148 That said, to the extent that government corporation
regulators are corporations that are organizationally independent of other
agencies, they retain more autonomy in their decision-making process. Still,
as quasi-agencies, they have to maintain a rather rigorous decision-making
process.
Fourth, similar to government agency regulators, government
corporation regulators can hardly offer a competitive pay package. After all,
they are quasi-agencies that tend to benchmark their salary bands to that of
government agencies. For example, the basic annual salary band for FDIC
corporate managers and/or executives is between USD 115,635 and USD
www.aba.com/Tools/Economic/Documents/WhoPaysDepositInsurance.pdf [https://perma.c
c/Y6PJ-PM39] (last visited June 25, 2018).
145. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, §10(e)(1) (U.S.).
146. FCA, Fees and Levies, https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/fees [https://perma.cc/U46E-
FXH5] (last visited June 26, 2018). It is worth noting that the FCA’s executive board
members and senior executives are eligible to be considered for a significant amount of
performance-related award. According to the most recent FCA annual report, “from 1 April
2016 to 31 March 2017, the executive board members and senior executives were eligible to
be considered for a performance-related award up to a maximum of 35% of average base
salary applying during the previous year.” FCA, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2016/17,
96 (July 2017), available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/annual-reports/annual-report-
2016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KW4-HKCL] (last visited June 30, 2018). Whether such a
performance-based remuneration for senior executives incentivizes profit-seeking behaviors
remains empirically untested, but it is probably fair to say that even present some profits-
driven activities within the government corporation, the legal mandate which legitimizes their
activities still constrains them based on which of their activities are legitimized.
147. FDIC, Mission, Vision, and Values, https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/
mission.html [https://perma.cc/Z6ZT-DDP2] (last visited June 26, 2018).
148. FCA, Reporting to Treasury and Parliament, https://www.fca.org.uk/about/report
ing-treasury-parliament [https://perma.cc/RP4W-VL38] (last visited June 26, 2018).
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291,065, according to the FDIC’s 2018 Base Salary Structures.149 This is
just slightly above the salary band for OCC’s managers and/or executives
(which is between USD 78,572 and USD 282,500). Therefore, government
corporation supervisors face similar disadvantages when competing for
talent with the private sector.
Last but not least, government corporation regulators also face a
significant degree of political pressure. They generally possess relative
budgetary autonomy because they operate on a self-sufficient basis.150 With
regards to personnel, the major positions of government corporation
regulators remain politically appointed. For example, the FDIC’s board of
directors consists of five members 151 who are entitled to six-year term
protection.152 That said, these five members consist of the Comptroller of
the OCC, the Director of the CFPB, and three other members appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate. 153 The composition of the
FDIC’s board of directors does not differ significantly from other
government agency regulators in the United States. The FCA is similar in
that the Treasury appoints its board of directors.154 In general, government
corporation regulators resemble independent government agency regulators
in that their budget is relatively independent of politics yet their personnel
remains profoundly captured by the politics.
The above illustration seems to suggest that the government corporation
model is not much different from the government agency model.
Nevertheless, the form of corporations per se still produces some meaningful
differences. For one, the corporate form helps government corporation
regulators retain some operational flexibility. In general, government
149. FDIC, 2018 FDIC Base Salary Structures, https://www.fdic.gov/about/jobs/2018cgc
mcxem.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKM2-XYQQ] (last visited June 26, 2018).
150. To be sure, the budget of government corporation supervisors still faces some level
of political scrutiny. For example, the FCA still needs to “report to the Treasury on our
progress through our Annual Report. The Treasury then submits a report to Parliament that
examines our performance against our statutory objectives, and how we have dealt with major
regulatory cases.” FCA, Reporting to Treasury and Parliament, https://www.fca.org.uk/
about/reporting-treasury-parliament [https://perma.cc/RP4W-VL38] (last visited June 26,
2018). The FDIC is also required to annually submit a full report of its operations, activities,
budget, receipts, and expenditures for the preceding 12-month period to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall cause the same to be
printed for the information of Congress. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT, §17(a)(1) and
(2). The FDIC is further required to file other reports to the Treasury and the Office of
Management and Budget. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT, §17(b) and (c).
151. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT, §2(a)(1).
152. Id. §2(c)(1).
153. Id. §2(a)(1).
154. FCA, Reporting to Treasury and Parliament, https://www.fca.org.uk/about/reporting
-treasury-parliament [https://perma.cc/RP4W-VL38] (last visited June 26, 2018).
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corporations are independent legal entities instead of organs of the
government, which allows them some discretion in settling disputes, making
contracts, holding property, borrowing, and issuing debts. 155 Some
government corporations may further retain their annual earnings. 156
Moreover, some civil service laws do not apply to their staff in certain cases,
which, at least, enhances the flexibility and attractiveness of their
employment package.157 This might partly explain why the FDIC can offer
a slightly better pay package than the OCC. While government corporation
regulators generally resemble government agency regulators in many
aspects, they enjoy an enhanced operational autonomy. The price is such
that enhanced autonomy might compromise the accountability of
government corporation regulators to political pressure.158
c. The Self-Regulatory Organization Model
Self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) also play a key role in the
financial world.159 SRO typically refers to a non-governmental organization
that has the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards.
They are particularly active in securities regulations such as listing and
disclosure regulations: many stock exchanges are SROs incorporated by
private industry participants rather than the government, and they regulate
and supervise the listing process and the public companies listed.160 Some
SROs further assume the role of financial regulators and supervise financial
firms. The most notable example is FINRA, a non-profit membership
corporation which serves an industry association of brokers and dealers and
155. Froomkin, supra note 139, at 553.
156. Id. at 554.
157. Id. at 553-54.
158. For a discussion of the unclear accountability of the FDIC, see generally Adam
Shajnfeld, An Identity in Disarray: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
Government-Agency Status, 128 BANKING L. J. 36 (2011).
159. There are four types of SROs in the securities markets of the United States: the
national securities exchanges, the national securities association, registered clearing agencies,
and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§3(a) (26) (2018). For a discussion of the SROs in the securities industry, see, e.g., Jonathan
Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s Penalties and the
Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963 (2012) (providing a theoretical framework
for understanding self-regulation and then discussing the court’s role in effectuating this
process; Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 101; Edwards, supra note 101; John I. Sanders,
Break from Tradition: Questioning the Primacy of Self-Regulation in American Securities
Law, 7 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 93 (2017) (outlining the history of American
securities laws).
160. For a discussion of how the SRO stock exchanges evolved in the United States, see
generally Sanders, supra note 159
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is now in charge of disciplining securities firms and brokers in the United
States.161
Compared to government agency regulators and government
corporation regulators, the organizational features of SRO regulators are
relatively unique. Firstly, SRO regulators are not monopolistic. For
example, there are currently twenty-one registered national securities
exchanges registered in the United States competing for the market of listing
supervision. 162 Even FINRA, the sole SRO regulator in charge of
disciplining brokers and dealers in the United States, faces the other parallel
broker-and-dealer regulator, the SEC.163 That said, the number of SRO
regulators remains limited due to the prior approval requirement; thus, SRO
regulators are mostly oligopolistic and face a limited level of competition.164
The absence of a sufficient level of competition may trigger the race to the
bottom concern.165
Second, SRO regulators may or may not be profit-oriented. Some SRO
supervisors, such as certain stock exchanges like the NYSE, are for-profit
corporations that are permitted to distribute dividends to their stockholders.
To maximize their profits, these SROs may have more incentive to consider
the needs of the potential pool of regulated firms, which makes their
regulatory activities better received by the regulated industry. That said,
many SRO regulators are non-profit corporations. FINRA, for instance, is a
non-profit corporation that does not allow the distribution of its earnings to
any private individual.166 It also funds its activities by industry fees without
the support of any taxpayer dollars.167 These non-profit SRO regulators more
resemble government corporation regulators, which maintain self-sufficient
budgets and do not pursue profits.
161. FINRA, Rules and Guidance, http://www.finra.org/industry/rules-and-guidance
[https://perma.cc/DDK5-2DLN] (last visited June 26, 2018). For an introduction of the
evolution of FINRA, see generally Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 101.
162. U.S. SEC, Fast Answers: National Securities Exchanges, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html [https://perma.cc/4JND-UZB9] (last
visited June 26, 2018).
163. SEC still retains an independent regulatory power over brokers and dealers although
it delegates most of its power to FINRA and takes a relatively deferent stance. JAMES D. COX
ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1026-27 (8th ed. 2017).
164. Some observers even observed that the market power of an SRO regulator is
positively correlated with its enforcement power. “As market power goes up, so too does its
power over the entities it regulates.” See generally Macey & Novogrod, supra note 159.
165. For a critic of the SRO regulator model, see, e.g., Sanders, supra note 159.
166. FINRA, Restated Certificate of Incorporation, art. Fourth (July 2, 2010) (providing
that FINRA “is not organized and shall not be conducted for profit, and no part of its net
revenues or earnings shall inure to the benefit of any individual, subscriber, contributor, or
member.”)
167. FINRA, FINRA 2018 Annual Budget Summary (2018).
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Third, the decision-making process of SRO regulators can be less
rigorous. On the one hand, SRO regulators mainly represent the industry’s
overall interest, which streamlines the decision-making process. While SRO
regulators are also concerned with the public interest in general, they are
more prone to the interest of the regulated industry than government agency
regulators or government corporation regulators.168 This narrower focus, in
turn, streamlines their decision process. SRO regulators are also led by
industry leaders who experience a smaller informational gap with industry
practices. Their enhanced experience with the industry helps shorten the
information-gathering process and enhances decisional quality and
efficiency. On the other hand, the due process requirement on SRO
regulators is less stringent. Admittedly, SRO regulators still need to observe
the basic fairness requirement when proceeding with their disciplinary
processes. FINRA, for example, is required to “provide a fair procedure for
the disciplining of members and persons associated with members . . . .”169
This fairness requirement, however, is subject to a relatively modest level of
judicial supervision and due process requirements.170
Fourth, SRO regulators generally offer more attractive pay packages to
their employees. For one thing, the staff of SRO regulators are not public
officials; thus, their pay is not subject to the salary grade for public officials.
This allows a more flexible pay structure. For example, FINRA maintains a
somewhat competitive compensation program that includes base salary,
incentive compensation, and benefits.171 Such flexible pay structure, in turn,
increases the overall pay to the staff of SRO regulators. In FINRA’s case,
their top executives reportedly received one million to one and a half million
U.S. dollars in 2016,172 which surpasses the salary received by the executives
of OCC and FDIC by a significant amount. Admittedly, this salary level
might remain incomparable to the pay for private executives. It does,
168. To be sure, the industry interest here refers to not only the short-term self-interest of
the industry but also the long-term reputational interest of the industry. To the extent that SRO
regulators concern the latter, they would not narrowly focus on relaxing the regulatory burden
of the supervisees, but would instead streamline the regulatory process to strike a more
delicate balance of the cost and benefit of financial supervision.
169. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §15A(b)(8) (2018).
170. COX ET AL., supra note 163, at 1025-26 (introducing the First Jersey Securities Inc.
v. Bergen case, in which the court dismissed the respondent broker-dealer’s claim that the
disciplinary process breaches due process because the disciplinary panel is made up of its
business competitors).
171. Compensation, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/compensation [https://perma.c
c/2KJG-GWZU] (last visited June 27, 2018).
172. Mason Braswell, FINRA Freezes Executive Pay as Revenue Declines, ADVISORHUB
(July 5, 2017), https://advisorhub.com/finra-freezes-executive-pay-revenue-declines/ [https:/
/perma.cc/X7X4-58PL].
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however, represent a significant increase when compared to government
agency regulators and government corporation regulators.
Last but not least, SRO regulators are more independent of the politics
than of the industry. Regarding the budget, as mentioned previously, SRO
regulators rely on its finance instead of government appropriations. More
importantly, their budget is not subject to further governmental scrutiny. In
FINRA’s case, it was not until 2018 that they published their annual budget
to the public for the first time.173 Regarding personnel, the major positions
of SRO regulators generally consist of industry representatives whose
appointment is not subject to any political approval. In FINRA’s case, its
board of governors consists of ten industry members representing different
industrial sectors, fourteen public members determined by the board of
governors, and the chief executive officer.174 The government does not
intervene in the appointment of any board member. Due to this relative
autonomy in budget and personnel, SRO regulators are more independent of
politics. Therefore, they can be less disturbed by the different political
interests represented by politicians and exercise their expert judgment
unfettered by some populist voices. The price, in contrast, is the reduced
accountability to the general public. SRO regulators could prioritize the
industry interest over public interests.175
The above illustration suggests that the SRO model is more market- and
industry-oriented, facing less public scrutiny and holding less public
accountability. Inevitably, this model triggers the concern that the regulated
industry might capture the SRO regulators and compromise the quality of
regulation and supervision. The SRO model builds in two mechanisms to
mitigate this concern. The first one is a public mechanism. SRO regulators
remain subject to the supervision of a public regulator. Taking the FINRA
for example, the SEC possesses the power to supervise FINRA by, for
instance, chartering FINRA and reviewing FINRA’s rulemaking. 176 To
some extent, one can say that the SEC delegates its regulatory power to
FINRA and shifts its mission from directly supervising broker-dealers to
173. News Release of FINRA Publishes Budget Summary and Financial Principles for
First Time, FINRA (Jan. 18, 2018), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2018/finra-publishes-
budget-summary-and-financial-principles-first-time [https://perma.cc/WZG8-JU8N].
174. FINRA Board of Governors, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/finra-board-
governors [https://perma.cc/NW6X-YK2C] (last visited June 26, 2018); Restated Certificate
of Incorporation, art. Eighth, FINRA, (July 2, 2010) http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/d
isplay.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4589 [https://perma.cc/YFE2-VVEG].
175. Edwards, for instance, observed this phenomenon in the FINRA practice. See
generally Edwards, supra note 101 (alleging that FINRA’s structure is such that FINRA is
more aligned with the industry rather than with the public).
176. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §15A(b), 15 U.S.C. §78(o-3) (2018).
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indirectly supervising FINRA. Naturally, such a mechanism risks the
potential that the SEC over-defers to FINRA.177 The second one is a market
mechanism. SRO regulators regulate the industry for the benefit of the
industry, including the short-term and long-term benefits. Therefore, they
should consider not only the interest of individual firms but also the long-
term development of the whole industry. If SRO regulators egregiously
ignore its mandate, the whole industry might lose the public’s trust, which
jeopardizes the industry’s long-term development. Worse than that, the
legislative branch or the government regulator might take back the regulatory
power delegated to the SRO regulators. While this market mechanism is not
perfect as well, it more or less prevents SRO regulators from outrageously
abusing their power.
d. The Delegated Gatekeeper Model
The above three models, in general, adopt a centralized model which
leaves the task of financial regulation and supervision to a single, or several,
entities. This is unsurprising; after all, centralization is the standard feature
of financial regulation and supervision. That said, world financial regulators,
in practice, also adopt decentralized ways to streamline their mandate. When
examining the compliance of the regulated financial institution, many
financial regulators delegate its examination power to private gatekeepers.
In some cases, financial regulators even allow the regulated financial
institutions to select the examiner, such as external auditors. We term this
model as a “delegated gatekeeper model” because the power of the examiner
is delegated from the financial regulator.178
We use the law and practice in Taiwan as an example as we observe an
interesting shift. Since 1992, Taiwan’s banking regulator, the Ministry of
Finance, may appoint private professionals, especially accountants, to
examine the business and finance of banks on the regulator’s behalf, and the
examined banks undertake the examination fee.179 In the implementation,
however, the banking regulator largely delegated this appointment power to
177. For this observation, see, e.g., Sanders, supra note 159, at 114 (describing the shift
in the balance of power away from the SEC and towards FINRA).
178. For related studies, see, e.g., THE WORLD BANK CENTRE FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING
REFORM, BANKING SUPERVISORS AND EXTERNAL AUDITORS: BUILDING A CONSTRUCTIVE
RELATIONSHIP (2015) (presenting the findings of a survey on external auditors and banking
supervision); Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, Banking Supervision and External
Auditors: What Works Best? (BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper Series, No. 2017- 46,
2016) (examining the advantages and disadvantages of using external auditors in banking
supervision).
179. BANKING ACT, art. 45 (Taiwan).
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each examined bank, under which each bank may designate qualified
accountants, subject to the regulator’s consent, to examine its business and
finance.180 The banking regulator and the accountant would negotiate the
examination fee based on the hourly rate as negotiated between the examined
bank and the appointed accountant.181 When paying the fee, the examined
bank must pay the fee to the banking regulator for the latter to pay the
appointed accountant.182 Under this design, the examined banks are entitled
to, first, select the examining accountant, and second, negotiate the hourly
rate of the examination fee. Therefore, they possess considerable leverage.
The banking regulator, however, retains some counterbalance tools. For
example, it can disapprove the accountant selected by the examined bank ex-
ante, negotiate the final amount of examination fee ex-post, and control the
final payment of the examination fee. This model is more like a “supervisee-
supervisor gatekeeper” one, under which the regulated banks and the
regulator co-appoints the delegated gatekeeper.
Taiwan’s banking regulator further delegates its supervisory power
after introducing the internal control of banks since 2000. 183 Banks in
Taiwan now must retain external accountants to audit its internal control
annually and report to the regulator the internal control, legal compliance,
etc. of the audited bank.184 Taiwan’s banking regulator can further require a
bank to retain accountants to audit the personal data protection and anti-
money laundering mechanism of the bank. 185 The audit fee is, again,
undertaken by the audited bank and negotiated between the audited bank and
the auditing accountant.186 Notwithstanding the above, the banking regulator
retains the discretion to change the auditing accountant ex-post and request
a re-audit. 187 Under this design, the audited banks possess even more
leverage. They now dominate the appointment process because the regulator
is no longer involved in the appointment of auditing accountants, and they
now dominate the auditing fee because the regulator is no longer involved in
the negotiation of the fee as well. The banking regulator, instead, can only
counterbalance the delegated gatekeepers by reviewing the audit results and
changing the auditing accountant ex-post. This model is more like a
180. REGULATION ON THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE’S APPOINTMENT OF ACCOUNTANTS FOR
EXAMINING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, art. 6(2) (Taiwan).
181. Id. art. 22(1) and (2).
182. Id. art. 22(3).
183. BANKING ACT, art. 45-1 (Taiwan).
184. IMPLEMENTATION RULES FOR THE INTERNAL CONTROL AND AUDITS OF FINANCIAL
HOLDING COMPANIES AND BANKS, art. 28(1) (Taiwan).
185. Id. art. 28(2).
186. Id. art. 28(3).
187. Id. art. 29.
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“supervisee gatekeeper” one, under which the regulated financial institution
appoints the delegated gatekeeper generally at its discretion.
Compared to the government agency model, the government
corporation model, and the SRO model, the delegated gatekeeper model is
undoubtedly more private. To begin with, it is not monopolistic at all. All
private gatekeepers, such as all accounting firms, are eligible to compete for
this supervision market. Specifically, they compete for the supervisee’s
appreciation of their examination or auditing service because it is the
supervisee that primarily decides the appointment and compensation. They,
however, also compete for the financial regulator’s affirmation because the
regulator still retains the right to consent to the selection ex-ante or to cancel
the selection ex-post. Therefore, they adapt to the needs of the regulated
financial institutions on the one hand but are concerned with the financial
regulator’s perception of them on the other hand.188
Second, these gatekeepers are relatively profit-driven. They are
business organizations that pursue profits from their operation. To maximize
their business profits, they have more incentive to improve their examination
service to adapt to the regulatory needs of the industry, including adopting
or even developing new RegTech solutions. They also maintain a flexible
budget that can expand their staff size to ensure their examination or auditing
quality as long as it is cost-efficient. Therefore, these gatekeepers can
overcome the under-staffing and under-enforcement problems that plague
government regulators. On the other hand, their profit motive, combined
with the appointment and compensation power of the supervisee, would
inevitably misalign these gatekeepers’ interest with the supervisees’ interest
instead of the public interest. To mitigate this concern, the government
regulator inevitably has to play the fireproof wall here.
Third, the decision process of the delegated gatekeepers can be less
rigorous. On the one hand, their decision involves less public concern. After
all, they are private entities that do not apply the due process mandate, and
their accountability to the public derives mainly from their accountability to
188. This is similar to the problems of credit rating agencies as exposed in the Global
Financial Crisis. For a discussion of the credit rating agencies, see generally Nina Dietz
Legind & Camilla Horby Jensen, The European Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, 30 L.
CONTEXT: A SOCIO-LEGAL J. 114 (2014) (examining the advantages and disadvantages of
Europe’s attempts to regulate credit agencies after the financial crisis); Frank Partnoy, What’s
(Still) Wrong with Credit Ratings, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1407 (2017) (addressing three areas of
concern with credit rating agencies after the financial crisis and proposing reduced reliance
on credit ratings and more oversight of these agencies to solve these problems); Lawrence J.
White, Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies, 24:2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 211 (2010)
(discussing the history of credit rating agencies leading up to the financial crisis and proposing
two possible policy changes in response to the credit rating industry).
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government regulators. On the other hand, they take a relatively limited
amount of time. They are typically paid by the hour, and they negotiate their
fees with the supervisees; thus, the time they devote to the examination
depends on the supervisees’ budget. Accordingly, the decision process of
gatekeepers is generally more flexible and more adaptive to the examined
financial institution rather than the public. The advantage is that this can
formulate a more efficient examination or auditing process that can deal with
a more massive amount of cases, while the disadvantage is that the
examination or audits made under this model might be less comprehensive.
Fourth, the delegated gatekeepers possess more top talents. They are
private business entities that attract top talents in the industry through
attractive pay packages. By delegating the supervision to these gatekeepers,
the government regulator indirectly retains top talents in the private sector to
conduct financial supervision while the examined financial institution
undertakes the cost.
Last but not least, gatekeepers are generally less independent of the
examined financial institution. The examined financial institutions generally
dominate the appointment and pay of gatekeepers, which makes gatekeepers
more adaptive to their needs.189 Although legally speaking, the government
regulator can control this potential capture by imposing reputational and/or
actual sanctions on the misbehaved gatekeepers, such threat of sanction is
less credible because the government regulator itself faces serious
informational asymmetry and budget restraint. The debate over credit rating
agencies, especially the movement away from the regulatory reliance on
credit rating agencies after the Global Financial Crisis,190 is telling of the
potential limits of the delegated gatekeeper model.
189. For example, the New York State Department of Financial Services has repeatedly
found auditing and consulting firms acceded to the examined financial institutions’ demands
and compromised their professional standards. See, e.g., N.Y. ST. DEPT. FIN. SERVICE.
Settlement Agreement In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 3 (2014) (finding that
“[t]he Department and PwC agree that PwC’s work as a consultant for the Bank in this matter
did not demonstrate the necessary objectivity, integrity, and autonomy that is now required of
consultants performing regulatory compliance work for entities supervised by the
Department. At BTMU’s request, PwC removed from a draft of the HTR Report a statement
that, had it known from the outset of the HTR about BTMU’s written instructions to strip wire
messages, PwC would have recommended that BTMU undertake a forensic review of its wire
transfers. PwC should have included such an express statement of its views in the HTR Report
to ensure complete disclosure to the Department of potential serious limitations on the HTR
process in light of the written instructions. Furthermore, PwC repeatedly acceded to the
Bank’s demands and redrafted the HTR Report in ways that omitted or downplayed issues of
material regulatory concern.”)
190. For a discussion of the regulatory reliance problem of credit rating agencies, see
generally Partnoy, supra note 188 (discussing how regulated institutions continue to rely on
credit ratings despite Congress’s attempts to remove credit rating agency regulatory licenses).
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C. Summary
Based on the above illustration, we can sum up the different
organizational models of financial regulators into the table below.










Competition Monopolistic Monopolistic Oligopolistic Competitive
Profit
Orientation No No Low/Moderate
191 High
Decision
Process Rigorous Rigorous Less than Rigorous Flexible
Pay Low Low Moderate High
Public
Accountability Strong/High
192 High Moderate Low/Little193
There are three notes worth highlighting here. First, we can further
subdivide the category of Government Agency into non-independent ones
and independent ones. The former are subject to greater scrutiny from
politics and are thus more accountable to the public. Second, we can also
subdivide the category of Self-regulatory Organization into profit SROs and
non-profit SRO. The latter is less profit-oriented than the former. Third, we
can subdivide the category of Delegated Gatekeeper into supervisee-
supervisor ones and supervisee ones. The latter incurs more capture from
individual supervisees and are thus less accountable to the public than the
former.
IV. INNOVATING THE ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS OF FINANCIAL
REGULATORS FOR THE REGTECH ERA
The above comparison lays down a foundation for us to theorize the
organizational models of financial regulators. Specifically, we can depict a
public-private spectrum, ranging from a pure public-dominated model (like
the government agency model) to a relatively private-dominated model (like
191. “Low” is used for non-profit SROs while “Moderate” is for for-profit SROs.
192. “Strong” is used for non-independent government agencies while “High” is for
independent government agencies.
193. “Low” is used for supervisee-supervisor gatekeepers while “Little” is for supervisee
gatekeepers.
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the delegated gatekeeper model). Based on this theory, we can innovate
more potential public-private partnership models of financial regulators that
may suit the RegTech era.
A. Theorizing the Public-Private Spectrum of Financial Regulators
As mentioned previously, to use RegTech effectively and efficiently, a
financial regulator needs to be flexible and adaptive in its operation on the
one hand and accountable to the public interest on the other hand. This,
however, seems to be a Gordian knot for both public and private regulators.
As illustrated previously, public regulators, such as government agency
regulators and government corporation regulators, are generally more
accountable to the public, but they are poor in operational efficiency due to
their low competition, non-profit nature, due process mandate, and low pay
packages. In contrast, private regulators, such as SRO regulators or private
gatekeepers, are more flexible and adaptive in their operation yet less
accountable to the public. No one is perfect. We might have to recognize
that there is an inevitable tradeoff between the operational flexibility and the
public accountability, or more specifically, a tradeoff between private
elements and public elements. The real question, then, is how to strike a
delicate balance between the two.
a. The Transaction Cost Economics and Comparative Institutional
Analysis
Each organizational model of financial regulators possesses some
public and private elements interacting with each other. To simplify the
analysis, we may posit the government (which represents the public
elements) at the center and observe how the government interacts with other
non-governmental actors (which represent private elements). In this way,
we boil down the question into the choice of forms for the government to
transact for the services from non-governmental actors to conduct financial
regulation and supervision.
The Transaction Cost Economics have long studied this choice of
transaction form question and have developed a sophisticated theory for it.
Tracing back to the famous Theory of the Firm developed by Ronald H.
Coase in 1937, Coase explained that firms exist because it is a centralized
form of transaction that can save the transaction costs typically involved in
the decentralized contracting relationships, including the search and
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement
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costs. 194 According to Coase’s theory, “firms will emerge to organize what
would otherwise be market transactions whenever their costs were less than
the costs of carrying out the transactions through the market.” 195
Accordingly, the choice between a centralized or decentralized form of
transactions, that is, firms or contracts, primarily depends on the relative
transaction costs involved.
To further elaborate the Theory of the Firm, the Transaction Cost
Economics, contributed significantly by Oliver E. Williamson, developed a
theoretical framework for comparing different forms of transactions. 196
Specifically, Williamson depicted a spectrum for conducting a comparative
institutional assessment of discrete institutional alternatives, “of which
classical market contracting is located at one extreme; centralized,
hierarchical organization is located at the other; and mixed modes of firm
and market organization are located in between.”197 This spectrum analysis
illustrated more possible forms of transactions. 198 More importantly,
Williamson offered a theory for explaining the conditions under which
different forms of transactions work more efficiently. In particular, he
identified asset specificity as the most decisive element for choosing between
contracts and firms; when the transacted asset is more specific in the sense
that the investment in such asset is less re-deployable, transacting it through
the form of firms are more favorable than the form of contracts.199 On the
other hand, Williamson also identified the limits of firms; for example, the
form of firms may involve incentive problems, with the agency problem as
the notable instance, as well as other bureaucracy costs.200 Williamson’s
theory thus further boils down the choice between different forms of
transactions into a calculation of the factors of asset specificity, incentive
problems, and other bureaucracy costs.
We may apply the above theories to conduct a comparative institutional
analysis of the different organizational models of financial regulators. To do
194. See generally R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33-55 (1988)
(examining how firms and markets respond and act in regard to transaction costs).
195. Id. at 7.
196. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985) (studying economic organization through the lens of transaction costs and applies the
theory of transaction cost economics to various institutions and public policy arguments).
197. Id. at 42.
198. See id. at 72-79 (explaining which transactions require either trilateral, bilateral, or
unilateral governance).
199. Id. at 90-96.
200. Id. at 131-47; WILLIAMSON, supra note 196, at 148-53. For a discussion of the agency
problem and incentives, see generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3:4 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 305 (1976) (pioneering the study of the agency problem).
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it, it may be useful to first reflect on how the current organizational models
of financial regulators are situated.
b. Depicting a Firm-Contract Spectrum based on the Current
Models
To facilitate the analysis, we use a spectrum such as that depicted below
to illustrate the different forms of transaction made between the government
and non-governmental actors in the context of financial regulation and
supervision. Interaction in the form of firms suggests a control and
command relationship, under which the government more strongly
dominates the non-governmental actors, whereas an interaction in the form
of contracts suggests an equal and autonomous relationship, under which the
government less strongly dominates the non-governmental actors. The chart
below depicts our observation of the current organizational models of
financial regulators, with the left-most one referring to the most firm-type
relationship while the right-most one refers to the most contract-type
relationship.
Chart 1: The Firm-Contract Spectrum of the Current Organizational
Models of Financial Regulator
The left three organizational models of regulators present a public-
private interaction that adopts the form of firms. Non-independent
government agencies feature an intra-firm interaction. They recruit private
talents into the agencies and subject them to all civil official rules, due
process mandates, personnel and budgetary control, etc. Private talents
essentially become components of the government agency subject to the
government’s direct control and command. Thus, we categorize it as an
“Intra-Firm” relationship. In contrast, government corporations feature an
inter-firm interaction. Although the government can similarly exert control
398 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 21:2
and command over government corporations and their staff, the corporate
form of government corporations has its merits. As mentioned previously,
the corporate form at least preserves some autonomous space for government
corporation regulators. The relationship between the government and
government corporations resembles that between a parent company and its
subsidiary company. Although the former can exert a significant level of
command and control over the latter, it is different from the intra-firm
command and control. Therefore, we categorize it as an “Inter-Firm”
relationship.
Independent government agencies, lying somewhere in the middle, are
somewhat tricky. In form, they are similar to non-independent government
agencies and should feature an intra-firm relationship as well. In substance,
however, since they generally retain budgetary autonomy and, in many
cases, operational autonomy, they somehow cut off the private talents
recruited into these agencies from the direct control and command from other
agencies. To that extent, independent government agencies are essentially
separate firms that are independent of other government agencies.
Therefore, we categorize it as a “Quasi-Inter-Firm” relationship.
In contrast, the three right-most organizational models of regulators
present a public-private interaction that adopts the form of contracts. Neither
the SROs nor the gatekeepers are part of the government; instead, they exert
the regulatory and supervisory authority due to the government regulator’s
delegation, which is functionally a contract. Therefore, private talents in
these regulators are subject to significantly less command and control from
the government. Among these three regulators, the government exerts the
most contractual control on SROs since it is in charge of chartering the
SROs, reviewing the rules of SROs, and granting them an exclusive or nearly
exclusive power to regulate others. Therefore, SRO regulators contract
directly with the government for nearly uncontested regulatory power. In
contrast, in the cases of supervisee gatekeepers, the government does not
directly contract with these gatekeepers as it is the examined financial
institution which retains these gatekeepers. Each private gatekeeper does not
possess uncontested regulatory power as well considering that it has to
compete for the examination or audit market with other private gatekeepers.
Therefore, they contract indirectly with the government for a contested
regulatory power. Finally, the supervisee-supervisor gatekeepers are in the
middle. They generally resemble supervisee gatekeepers whose regulatory
power is contested. The main difference is that, while the government does
not select the gatekeepers in its initiative, it retains an ex-ante consent right.
To that extent, they contract with the government in a rather semi-directly
manner.
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c. Detailing the Firm-Contract Spectrum
The firm-contract spectrum can undoubtedly contain more than these
types of public-private interactions. In particular, many possibilities lie in
the middle of the current firm-type and contract-type models. Below we
attempt to detail the firm-contract spectrum and spot out a greater number of
possible types of public-private interactions.
Let us start by expanding the form of firms. The current models of firm-
type financial regulators are mostly non-profit entities that are wholly-owned
or controlled by the government, which features dominant control and
command by the government. There are, however, other possibilities,
especially the ones with less governmental control and command. For
instance, using a mixed-ownership structure can water down governmental
control and command in the operation of the government corporation
regulator. Instead of forming a government-wholly-owned corporation, the
government owner can allow other investors to invest in this government
corporation regulators. The government subsequently remains the
controlling owner of this corporation and dominate its operation, but other
investors might introduce some non-governmental elements causing
different organizational chemistry. We term this model as the “Controlled
Inter-Firm” model. The government can even let other investors dominate
the operation of this government corporation and play merely the role of a
block-holder or active shareholder by, for example, appointing public
interest directors (who are not government officials) on the board. We term
this model as the “Participated Inter-Firm” model. In addition to
streamlining the ownership structure of a government corporation, we can
also streamline the mandate of a government corporation. For instance,
instead of forming a non-profit government corporation, a government can
form a for-profit government corporation to undertake the regulatory
mandate. We term this model as the “For-Profit Firm” model. Different
mandates can also bring different chemistry to the quality of financial
regulation and supervision. Chart 2 below illustrates these points, with the
bolds and italics highlight the expanded types.
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Chart 2: The Expanded Firm-Type Interaction
Now let us turn to the formation of contracts. To begin with, under the
current contract-type models, the government generally delegates a large part
of its regulatory power to private entities. The government, however, can
also sign a non-delegation contract with private entities, under which the
government only asks private entities to play a supportive role instead of
delegating the regulatory power to private entities. Under this model, the
government dominates the regulatory power or only “shares” its regulatory
power with private entities in a limited scope, which ensures more public
accountability but at the same time introduces some private elements. We
term this model the “Non-delegation Contract” model. Alternatively, the
government can delegate some of its regulatory power to another public or
quasi-public entity, such as a public university, national laboratory, or
national research institute, instead of a private entity like an industrial
association or private gatekeeper. Public or quasi-public entities with strong
research and technology capacity are potentially suitable for enabling
RegTech-based regulatory and supervisory approaches as their
organizational competence allows them to develop and validate RegTech
solutions more effectively. Such delegation can also mitigate the public
accountability concern. We term this model the “Direct and Exclusive
Public Contract” model. Lastly, even though the government delegates to a
private gatekeeper on a non-exclusive basis, it can contract directly with the
private gatekeeper instead of indirectly through the supervisees. This can
reduce the potential of supervisee capture. We term this model the “Direct
and Non-Exclusive Contract” model. Chart 3 below illustrates these points,
with the bold and italics highlight the expanded types.
2018] REGTECH AND THE NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL REGULATORS 401
Chart 3: The Expanded Contract-Type Interaction
To be sure, we do not claim the superiority of any model to the others.
What we attempt to do here is merely to explore the potential organizational
models of financial regulators as possible in a systematic way. We
understand that it is nearly impossible to theorize a perfect model in abstract,
and we do not even intend to judge the current models. In the end, an
economy needs to assess which model is more suitable for itself based on its
context and complementary institutions in light of the asset specificity,
incentive, and bureaucracy costs as cautioned by Williamson.
B. Innovating the Potential Models of Financial Supervisors for the
RegTech era
Based on the above discussion, we can identify some potential
organizational models of financial regulators for the RegTech era.
a. A mixed-ownership RegTech corporation
Drawing reference from the Inter-Firm models as shown in Table 2, the
government regulator can promote the adoption of RegTech solutions by
founding a RegTech corporation. Besides, the regulator can consider co-
founding it with some private entities such as information technology
corporations, financial institutions, or even telecommunication firms. In
designing the ownership structure of this corporation, the government
regulator can be either the majority owner that controls its operation or a
minority block-holder that plays an influential yet non-dominant role in its
operation. Moreover, this corporation can be either for-profit or non-profit.
This approach is not without any precedents. Many stock exchanges
around the world maintain a mixed ownership structure, under which the
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government shares ownership with private investors.201 Federal Reserve
Banks in the United States might also fit in this category as their management
power is shared between the public Federal Reserve Board of Governors and
the private member banks.
b. A Contracted RegTech Supporter
Drawing reference from the Non-Delegation model as shown in Table
3, the government can promote the adoption of RegTech by signing a
technical support contract with other technology providers. Under this
approach, the government regulator remains to hold its regulatory power, but
private entities can technically support its exercise of supervision. For
instance, the government regulator can retain a private company to develop
a privately-run RegTech-based platform through which the regulator
receives real-time (or in close real-time) updates and alerts on the
noncompliant activities and suspicious transactions of regulated financial
institutions. Austria’s Central Bank, Oesterreichische Nationalbank
(“OeNB”) provides a good example of this approach. In 2014, the OeNB
collaborated with the Austrian banking industry to implement an innovative
approach of regulatory reporting. They created a software platform which
operates as a central interface between the OeNB and the banks to achieve
standardization of data collection.202 Through the creation of a company
entity (Austrian Reporting Services GmbH (“AuRep”)) co-owned by the
seven largest banks in the country, the OeNB, in essence, retains a private
company and utilizes the software platform operated by the company to
facilitate automatic collection of granular bank data.203
The above example aside, this approach is also similar to government
procurement of products and services from a functional perspective. Despite
all these nuances, the critical point is that, under this approach, the
201. For instance, the major shareholders of Taiwan Stock Exchange consist of both state-
owned companies and private companies in Taiwan. The former include the Bank of Taiwan
(10.01% shareholding), Mega International Commercial Bank (8.00% shareholding), Taiwan
Cement (6.63% shareholding), First Bank (3.00% shareholding), the Land Bank of Taiwan
(2.99% shareholding), Taiwan Sugar (2.99% shareholding), etc. The latter include the CDIB
Capital International (7.00% shareholding), Yuanta Securities (6.44% shareholding), Jihsun
Securities (3.26% shareholding), Fubon Securities (2.06% shareholding), etc.).
202. See Maciej Piechocki & Tim Dabringhausen, Reforming Regulatory Reporting -
From Templates to Cubes, IFC workshop on “Combining Micro and Macro Statistical
Data for Financial Stability Analysis. Experiences, Opportunities and Challenges” Warsaw,
Poland, 14-15 Dec 2015, 3, https://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb41o.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRF
6-UXPJ] (last visited July 1, 2018) (examining a new method of regulatory reporting through
a data-input model that involves the regulator and the regulated).
203. Id. at 3
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government regulator remains the one that disciplines noncompliant
activities or supervises regulatory reporting, but private companies can
provide tremendous technical support to it.204
c. A Quasi-Public Regulator Employing RegTech
Drawing reference from the Direct and Exclusive Public Contract
Model as shown in Table 3, if the government regulator intends to delegate
part of its supervisory power to another entity, it can consider delegating it
to a quasi-public entity. That is, instead of following the current SRO model
and delegating the regulatory power to a private industry association, which
invites the critics of industrial capture, the government regulator can delegate
it to other entities with more public nature. Potential candidates may include
universities, national research institutes, NGOs, or even social enterprises,
among others, whose operation is more public-interest-oriented and less
industry-oriented.
There can be some potential for this approach. For example, the Risk
Management Institute of the National University of Singapore developed the
Credit Research Initiative, which is a non-profit initiative that provides
public credit rating information. 205 The government regulator can, for
instance, delegate the supervision of credit risks to such kind of entities.
d. Directly-Delegated Gatekeepers
Drawing reference from the Direct and Non-Exclusive Contract Model
as shown in Table 3, if the government regulator intends to delegate the
examination or audits to private gatekeepers, it can consider doing it on its
own. That is, instead of allowing the examined financial institutions to select
private gatekeepers to examine their books or records, which invites the
critics of supervisee capture, the government regulator can select and pay
private gatekeepers directly on its initiative. The fee to be paid, however,
can remain undertaken by the examined financial institutions. This approach
might play an increasingly important role in the era of FinTech as more
supervisees will engage with third-party providers to deliver innovative
204. See Dou Shicong, Tencent Partners Shenzhen Government to Regulate Financial
Security, YICAI GLOBAL (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.yicaiglobal.com/news/tencent-partner
s-shenzhen-government-to-regulate-financial-security (describing when the Shenzhen
Municipal Government Financial Services Office recently partnered with Tencent Holdings
to develop a financial security big data platform to regulate financial security in Shenzhen).
205. See Credit Research Initiative, https://www.rmicri.org/en/home/ [https://perma.cc/7
UAZ-ZHZK] (last visited June 30, 2018) (advocating the usage of big data analytics to create
credit ratings).
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financial services and to develop technological solutions in order for
ensuring regulatory compliance. The regulator, in response, will need to
ensure that the supervisee has employed proper internal and external
safeguards to mitigate third-party risk, cyber risk and the like. In that case,
the regulator cannot rely merely on the supervisee to select and retain its
private gatekeeper as potential conflicts of interests may arise and deviate
the private gatekeeper from adhering to professional standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the era of RegTech, financial regulators need innovation in not only
the ways of regulation and supervision but also the organizational models of
those who carry out such regulation and supervision. The success of
RegTech development depends not only on the technology and its
application but also on the organization and people running the RegTech
solution. To help figure out a proper organizational model of financial
regulators in the RegTech era, in this paper, we summarize the experience of
the current organizational models of financial regulators, theorize a public-
private spectrum of financial regulators, detail this spectrum, and identify
more potential models of financial regulator. While we do not claim the
superiority of any model to others, the analyses of this paper delineate a
theoretical foundation for financial regulators across the globe to consider a
model that suits its own regulatory and supervisory needs.
